Ex-No. 2 in IDF intel. speaks war: & exhaustion & maneuver & # 39; – Israel News

Brig.-Gen. Itay Brun op

Brig.-Gen. Itay Brun at the annual Herzliya conference, 9 June 2014 ..
(photo credit: EREZ HARODI – OSIM TSILUM)

War and military intelligence are constantly changing. How should Israel and its secret community commemorate their tactics and goals as they evolve?

In a recent interview with The Jerusalem Post, former head of IDF military intelligence analysis Itai Brun concerning an English version of his book Intelligence Analysis: Understanding Reality in a Era of Dramatic Changes, the retired brigadier general investigated the dilemmas that were raised by this question.

Brun's book deals with intelligence analysis – the process whereby knowledge about the enemy and the environment is developed to serve decision-making in the field of policy design and operational planning, including in combat and force building.

In collaboration with the Israeli Memorial Center for Intelligence and Heritage, Brun, who led IDF intelligence analysis from 2011-2015, he tries to find a middle ground in a series of debates, including the spectrum between classic intelligence research and postmodern approaches in that area.

He advocates the use of non-traditional intelligence methods, such as proposing hypothetical paradigms and then measuring or proof that supports paradigms. The goal is to avoid group thinking, to create clarity between reality and deception and to avoid surprises.

Where do these theoretical approaches influence the collection and analysis of intelligence and thus contribute to achieving the goals of Israel for war and peace?

Brun explains that Israel has to deal with the challenges of the "disappearance" of the enemy. If that was earlier, the tank and troop implementations of Israeli opponents could be followed. Hamas and Hezbollah are now clandestinely attacked from tunnels or fire missiles hidden in civilian locations.

Brun recognized Aviv Kochavi, the head of the IDF intelligence service during his tenure as head of research, in determining the IDF needed to invest more intelligence resources at the operational level to find the hidden targets of Hamas. "Otherwise we would not find them."

He describes two methods of warfare: through wear and maneuvers.

While the IDF always excelled in maneuvering warfare, using creativity and speed to destroy its enemies, the IDF has now switched to a mixed approach that combines maneuverability and exhaustion speed.

Brun writes today that the IDF is still using a maneuver warfare to locate and destroy Hamas assets. But the IDF also invests huge resources in a way of warfare to systematically identify and destroy warfare.

Brun suggests that a number of military and intelligence services invested in locating and destroying a large number of targets may be wasteful and inefficient.

& # 39; Large & # 39; target factories & # 39; operate to meet this demand and constantly struggle with the issue of quality versus quantity.

When it is not possible to refer to a small number of quality goals, quantity begins to become important, assuming (the basis in reality is questionable) that that quantity will have an accumulating effect on the enemy's desire to continue fighting , "he is writing.

How does Brun compare his observation that the amount of destroyed targets is often plateaus in his impact on an opponent, by his encouragement of the use of intelligence to destroy systematic destruction of small targets to destroy the fighting ability of an enemy?

Brun's suggest that while attacking a single rocket launcher may have an insignificant military impact, the cumulative destruction of rocket crews makes it harder for Hamas to continue its fight.

The flogging received by Hezbollah in 2006 has since kept largely the Lebanese border since then and Brun believes that the beating that Hamas took in 2014 has a similar effect, although the border is not hermetically silent & # 39; is.

In that sense, an innovation that he proposes uses the word & # 39; deterrence & # 39; completely dismiss as a relic from the Cold War when there was absolute deterrence or none. Instead, he suggests emphasizing convincing the opponent to comply with a relative level of rest.

Ultimately, says Brun, the intelligence must answer the question of what pressure is needed to put an opponent to an end to a combat round.

Brun avoided the question of whether cyber- and big data tactics or classic hum is to be preferred when distinguishing Hamas's views on ending fighting. On the contrary, he said, both classical and modern intelligence tools in the hands of a seasoned analyst are needed to understand the thinking of Hamas & # 39; leadership.

The writings, internal verbal communication and public messages of that leadership are all an integral part of that concept, he stated.
Moreover, sometimes "the enemy himself does not even know" what his goals are, because when "they go into a bunker under a hospital, they do not even know" completely what is going on around them.

Intelligence can not remove all uncertainty and has often misunderstood opponents in the past, Brun said.

In that light, his more scientific approach to proposing and testing hypotheses against reality is not meant to remove uncertainty, but to reduce it and avoid being completely blinded by group thinking.

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