On Monday, a series of terrorist attacks took place in Chechnya on the first day of the official three-day weekend on the occasion of the holiday of Kurban Bayram. At ten o'clock in the morning, two men with knives attacked police officers who had a service at a checkpoint in the village of Shali. Another attacker tried to detonate himself at the DPS post in the village of Mesker-yurt. Two others wanted to blow up a car with propane tanks in Grozny. The explosive device worked, but it turned out to be of a low power. Cylinders remained unharmed. After the chase the attackers shot down three DPS officers in their car and died in a shootout with police officers, based on scattered messages in the media.
The attackers were, according to various sources, including official sources, underage residents of Chechnya. How precise they were and whether they were all underage is unclear.
The day of the attack was obviously not chosen by accident. It happened on a holy holiday for Muslims. And – when the leadership of Chechnya as a whole had passed the hajj to Mecca. These two circumstances have contributed greatly to the weakening of the attention of Chechen policemen.
And it is unlikely that teenagers would be able to calculate such details themselves.
From the analysis of available information it also follows that the last terrorist attack – the blowing up of the car, the attack on the traffic police during the chase and then the shooting with the employees – was carried out by two boys aged 17 and 11 years old. It turns out whether the eleven-year-old ran at high speed with a car, and his partner shot at the police officers, or – on the contrary. This fact raises huge doubts
there may be more attackers.
The organizers of the series of terrorist attacks are Chechen power services, apparently the 17-year-old Magomed Musayev, the only son of the first deputy mayor of the village of Shali Ramzan Musayev. To support this assumption, on the evening of August 20, a video appeared in the instigam of the television channel Grozny TV (@groznytv), in which Ramzan Musayev, in the presence of the first vice-minister of Interior for Chechnya, Apti Alaudinova, her son renounces and "everyone who has recruited and stood on his son has taken the path of terrorism and extremism".
This means that, instead of determining the circumstances of the second terrorist attack in Chechnya within three months, the deputy head of the Ministry of Interior, responsible for operational work, walks around the family members of the attackers and demands that they perform the ritual that is already customary for Chechnya.
It is quite clear that this video is only for one purpose – for the report for the head of the Ramzan Kadyrov republic.
The use of the principle of collective responsibility in the fight against terrorists underground is not the knowledge of Chechnya. However, it was Akhmat Kadyrov and then his son, who made this method one of the most important ways to fight militants in Chechnya. Such approaches were still working in some way, while in the Republic there was a "classic" forest underground and as long as it really had a "social base" – for example family members who could become hostages and who forced the militants to to give. But the last terrorist attack in Chechnya, carried out by the "forest", took place in December 2014 (an attack on Grozny). Since then, under the influence of events in the Middle East, the ideology and forms of terrorism around the world, including the North Caucasus and Chechnya, have changed drastically. Terrorism has evolved and modernized, but unfortunately these changes were not felt in Chechnya and they were not yet ready for them.
The basis of anti-terrorist forces in Chechnya are the police services, whose staff are often under-manned, because it is expensive to enter the Chechen police. Many Chechen policemen not only have a higher education or even a full-fledged secondary – they do not even know Russian well. The emphasis in the Chechen Ministry of Home Affairs is on training the armed forces departments, such as rapid response teams, at every police station. They are brilliantly equipped (usually at their own expense) and can be seen in dozens of commercials on the internet.
The nurturing heads of the district departments constantly perform demonstrative constructions, adapt the uniforms and outfits of their subordinates and simultaneously copy Ramzan Kadyrov.
All these constructions end with an effective image in the instagram of the head of the district department. The same service in the Chechen police is organized in a very specific way and the Russian regulatory documents that regulate this service have a very distant relationship. When it comes to a concrete case, such as recently with an attack on an orthodox church in the heart of Grozny, these same rapid reaction groups – the police police regiment of the name of the police. Akhmat Kadyrov, SOBR "Terek", even the local national guard – they all come on the scene when there is nothing to do. And under the cameras from local journalists begin to demonstrate their skills. The problem is that these skills (even if they are in possession) are at best suitable for special operations to destroy groups of forest bandits.
The current prevention of terrorism in Chechnya comes down to imposing responsibility on frontier workers, heads of rural settlements and family members of terrorists – often post factum.
A new type of terrorism, which depends on individual, unpredictable attacks with improvised means, can not really be prevented without the help of a family or close associates of a potential terrorist. But the interaction of the population with the police in this case is only possible if the police are not afraid of the horror, but see it as an ally. For example, in the ultra-conservative Austria, hostile to Muslim refugees, between the police and the Chechen diaspora in front of the General Igilov (organization banned in the Russian Federation) dialogue with threats in line. Chechen families inform the police immediately that the behavior of their relatives causes fear. Or that their children have left the house and there is reason to suspect that they did it under the influence of Igilov propaganda. The fugitives are immediately detained while trying to cross the Schengen border. And those who came to the Middle East and realized what terrible stupidity they had committed, it happened that they had returned. Yes, they all went through the investigation, the court, went to prison (the conditions were minimal). But they have all survived.
The way they fight terrorism in Chechnya has been a long time ago.
To face the confrontation with modern terrorist threats, we need not so much the power on which the bet is made, but also the brain.
The & # 39; brain center & # 39; the fight against terrorism in Chechnya is not the Ministry of the Interior, but the UFSB of the Republic. And no acts of terrorism are no reason to claim him. As if he is not. Nevertheless, it is this department that provides the necessary operational information to Chechen policemen.
With the operational information of the FSB's executive board for the Chechen Republic, mass arrests began in December 2016 in the districts of Grozny, Kurchaloevsky and Shalinsky. These detentions resulted in the execution of at least 27 people. Novaya Gazeta has written a lot about this, and it is this case that now shows us how ineffective the old patterns are in the fight against "new" terrorism.
This "operational information" was born in response to the attack on Grozny in December 2016. This attack demonstrated for the first time the modern Igilov terrorism of the republic. Chechnya security forces led by Kadyrov responded to what had happened to the old methods: mass arrests began to fight with a "bait" threat. Having entered its KTO in various areas of Chechnya, television networks have been overtaken by all power divisions of the republic. Held a large number of inhabitants of Chechnya, including minors. Novaya Gazeta published one of the standardized police tables, which provided data on 67 people detained in the Shali and Kurchaloevsky districts. Of course, there were many more such tables. All departments and departments of the Ministry of Interior for Chechnya in Grozny and the nearest districts scored people. It was difficult to check such a large number of detainees, and two emergency situations took place in the Ministry of the Interior of the city with an interval of one month. In both cases the prisoners took over the automatic weapons of the police officers and shot the officers down.
After the first case, at the end of 2016, Kadyrov even drove the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of the Interior for the Chechen Republic, Apti Alaudinov. However, when this information fell into public space, Alaudinov was returned to the post,
Despite the fact that his close associate of Kadyrov Vakhit Umaev has already settled in his office.
Such mass detentions in Chechnya are rarely formalized. But I have to say that the FSB Chechen officers have cooperated quickly with all detainees and have transferred their performance to the Chechen CPE. As a result of this operational work & # 39; legalized & # 39; some inmates conduct criminal proceedings against them. But at least 27 people have been killed. It is clear that this out-of-court massacre is a sort of excess of the executor & # 39; has become. Nothing is justified. According to our information, none of the detainees and executives in January kept them in the territory of the regiment patrol's police. Akhmat Kadyrov was not interested in the FSB as a really dangerous terrorist.
Criminal proceedings against detainees were instituted and investigated in violation of Russian law. In all these cases there are the same references from the FSB to Chechnya. Costs for all these cases were also written under a carbon paper – "sitting on a bench near the house was their intention to go to Syria and to join illegal armed formations." No "live" information on how recruitment works in Chechnya, how exactly people are influenced by IG ideologists, how terrorist attacks are planned – there is nothing in criminal cases. Actually, there is practically nothing at all in them, except "sincere confessions". of the defendants themselves.
Judging from these criminal cases, neither the Chechen FSB nor the republican Interior Ministry present a new threat and do not understand how to deal with it.
Working with detainees after the December attack on Grozny was like a lottery. Someone has drawn a ticket with a minus sign, someone – an article of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and someone – a sign of "plus". These are real numbers on the police photo table: those who were marked with a "minus" disappeared without a trace, those who were marked with a "plus" returned home. That was the majority: after having held the regiment from a few days to a few weeks on the territory, they were released. And more significant opportunities were for those whose families could pay a lot of money for the freedom of their loved ones.
Among the "January" detainees was the 16-year-old Magomed Musayev, the alleged organizer of the Monday attack. Musayev said on the number published in Novaya Gazeta that he was 48. His photo, date of birth and place of residence, as well as a note about belonging to the bandit group of a certain Sargsyan Dargayev, were also in the same place.
What kind of bandit group it was and whether it existed in nature – a great mystery. It is possible that it was not there. But Magamed Musajev was probably not alone for that reason. And not even because at the time of detention a minor was. But because his father, Ramzan Musayev, took a serious position and could pay for a single son as a de facto ransom.
And now, a year later, Magamed Musayev became, according to Chechen security officials, the organizer of a series of suicide attacks on police officers. With knives and improvised explosives, these children were not only deadly, but also dead.
Why? We unfortunately never understand this. Because those who fight terrorism in Russia have neither the desire to understand it nor the desire to prevent it.