Brezhnev demanded too much
The occupation of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 did not surprise the Americans,
because in early July the CIA analysts took into account the states in Warsaw
the treaty will probably become military. Yet it still existed
the hope that the Soviet Union did not end up violently.
The opportunity took place at the end of July and August, when in Čierna nad Tisou
For four days, the delegations of Alexander Dubcek and the head of the Kremlin discussed Leonid
Brezhnev. When the CIA subsequently drafted the report, it was worthwhile doing it
lack of reliable information, but succeeded reasonably
to find out what happened between July 29 and August 1. "The first day or
the first two days seemed a weak attempt on both sides to settle the dispute. "
US intelligence services were not clear or Czechoslovak proposals
was the Soviet leader, Dubcek, head of the Communist Party
President Ludwig Svoboda.
From the findings of the CIA, Brezhnev began to speak with a sharp tone
in the introduction he pretended to meet the requirements of Czechoslovak representatives
they refused: "The Moscow delegation wanted them to agree with a common delegation
Soviet Czechoslovak defense of their western borders, with renewal
censorship of the press, removal of various reformist party leaders,
to keep non-communist parties in the Front National and to suppress them
alleged counterrevolutionary organizations. & # 39;
According to the CIA, the further course of the talks had an influence on the freedom he had taken
Brezhneva to a lighter tone. "He reminded the Soviet how often
served a common cause and threatened to renounce if no agreement was reached. "
Freedom, which from the viewpoint of Moscow was a recognized army general, apparently
he struggled with his fight against the Nazis when he left Buzuluk for Prague, and
that he was Minister of Defense in February 1948 when he was in Czechoslovakia
Concessions and What & # 39; s Next?
The Brezhnev process, according to the CIA, has tried to influence at least three
socialist states. Two were standing next to Dubcek, the third was fiercely against
him. "The Soviet delegation reportedly received letters from Romania and Yugoslavia
warn against threats of military intervention. "Conversely, the leader
Communist East Germany has asked the mosquitoes for this
no knife or millimeter: "Walter Ulbricht called them
he said he was against the compromise. & # 39;
Both delegations finally issued a joint communiqué on 1 July. Content was
vague. Significant oral agreements. The Czechoslovak leadership had
promise to shine for freedom of speech, change into
the leadership of the Communist Party of some people who lied to Brežnev
in the stomach, look at the activities of some organizations. Moscow
verbally interpreted Dubce's verbal guarantees as if he had signed them
paper with your own blood. By the way, according to the CIA, the only Czechoslovakian,
who was not admitted was the head of diplomacy Jiří Hájek.
Then both delegations met in Bratislava. some
the observer seemed to wipe the edges, but Brezhnev, who
he traveled home on August 3, saw later that Dubcek was reluctant to fulfill it,
to which he has spoken orally.
Like silence before the storm
When Brezhnev returned to Moscow, there was nothing that suggested that he would soon do so
hundreds of thousands of soldiers could bow to the borders of Czechoslovakia.
The CIA mentioned it as a naked fact in the report of August 21, then the day
the occupation also evaluated the events of the past weeks.
The Soviet politburo called on the central committee of the party not to keep informed
on the negotiations, but has only issued a short communiqué, according to which
general meetings were good work.
"Soviet leaders have left to leave, the Soviet press has withdrawn
attacks on Czechoslovakia, "said the CIA, with the possibility that Dubcek could
feel relieved. In fact, they did not understand that when Brezhnev handed them over to them
his hand before he left, he fed them with the ultimate. "What happened
in Czechoslovakia in a short period of time, proved that the Czechoslovaks
they did not understand that Black about Tisa thought they should come back
the reform movement, "said the CIA.
The secret service has asked a question (even in a previous report)
On July 12 strongly allowed the invasion), as possible so relatively
quickly from Dubcek's promise troops of the Warsaw Pact broke into pieces
Czechoslovakia. "It is unlikely that the Soviets – even if they persevere
they underestimate the power of the reform spirit – they expected Dubcek to do it
wonders within three weeks. Even if he promised, there was no chance,
to do this, "said the CIA, commenting on what the reasons are
Probably slower than a snail
Preparations for a possible invasion began sometime in April in Moscow
1968, no later than May. Nothing surprising because of military planners
had the task of drawing up a plan for the occupation of not one big city, but
The American secret service has come to the conclusion that this led to the invasion on 21 August
multiple facts. Eastern European communist allies of Brezhnev have already been lost
patience with Dubcek and pushing to send troops (they got involved later)
Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria). At the same time in Moscow
the political wing that is uniquely reluctant to win
use of force. (The CIA thought the Soviets had not come to Čierna nad Tisou
united, if it was the heaviest solution.)
Of course a lot has been played (perhaps the most) that also came out
Dubcek did not wait for miracles, almost from the beginning of August
did nothing about the will of Brezhnev. The CIA pointed out that
a man who became a symbol of spring in Prague, withdrew, so that it did
it can not be compared with anything other than the slow pace: "Dubcek
during the short period it had to make sure it was indisputable
the dominant position of the Communist Party, it did not convince. The media have worked hard,
there was no indication that non-communist elements were forced
pour into the holes. "
The concerns of the CIA mosaic in Moscow also added two visits
in Czechoslovakia after the return of Brezhnev on 3 August from Bratislava. To Prague
came the socialist leaders of Yugoslavia and Romania – the two countries that
they were not allowed to follow the orders of the Kremlin, which suggested it
another Eastern European state will not be a dedicated servant of the Soviet Union.
Events after the intervention
Shortly after the invasion, the Dubcek delegation had to agree with the humiliating
The protocols of Moscow, which in their content were actually a grave
of the Prague spring process. Dubcek remained at the head of the Communist Party, but as forced
to the actual surrender gradually lost the support of the domestic audience and
at the same time, communist dogma was frequent among those who
overcoat the coat. Including his later successor Gustav Husák, who
had previously written that he would never betray Dubcek.
Dubcek, who until the last moment thought he was talking about a possible one
the invasion is a game on his nerves and an instrument of exile, he started quickly
be aware that his days are counted in power. CIA report in November
1968 wrote that he publicly claimed that he wanted to remain at the head of the Communist Party, but
in his private life he said that he could keep two in his office
or three months. The American rapporteurs correctly rate Husak
the biggest chance to replace him. It happened in the middle
The tombstone of Gustav Husák, that is
buried in the native Bratislava (born in Dúbravka). Author: SITA, Diana
Dubcek was then the president of the federal parliament. Husak, who was that
a political intrigue and first of all looked at his own interests, him
forced him to sign the so-called legislative proposal law in August 1969 (
did not vote), allowing the persecution of demonstrators on the first anniversary
occupation. Dubcek – and therefore less popular – than
he could easily remove from the front of Parliament and take care of his
exclusion from the presidency of the party. So-called normalization has begun, so
a process that brought Czechoslovakia into its arms in a firm grip
Brezhnev was honoring Husak, but he did not give him any assurance
When the CIA rated the first months of Husak at the head of the CPC, she said that was the case
well-trained, dynamic, sophisticated, brilliant political tactics and at the same time
one of the most controversial people in Czechoslovak politics
the last 20 years. "He became the first intellectual of Vladimir's time
Lenin, who leads the Communist Party in Europe. "(Husak graduated
law.) According to his sources, the CIA stated that Husak Brezhnev had taken
in Moscow where he was a member of the Czechoslovak leadership after the invasion
signed a protocol to liquidate the Prague Spring.
He seemed energetic and convincing. It was necessary to completely reverse the coat,
what eventually happened. The Soviets then felt that Husak was right
a communist who can put things in order on the basis of his ideas.
For this CIA career maker, Brezhnev offered a reward for loyalty.
Even he got it fast. Quickly implement the federalisation plan, that
Husák was strongly supportive. The reality happened on January 1, 1969, then
officially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the two socialists began to function
republic – Czech and Slovak.
For less than three months the Husák cards took up, as the CIA clearly indicates
violence in Prague. Czechoslovak hockey players have won Soviet troops and others
in the second game at the championship in Sweden. On Wenceslas Square
gathered several tens of thousands of people who thought they were winning
symbolic retribution for profession.
Aeroflot broke out for the Prague branch of Soviet Aeroflot
the riots that led to the demolition. Many demonstrators
added to the provocateurs who started destruction. It was proof that
The Czechoslovak leadership still does not have the situation in its own hands. "The Russians
apparently he then asked for Dubcek's political removal and creation of a new one
leadership that will have effective control over the people. there
indications that Moscow threatened to send other soldiers in case they did
does not change ", wrote the CIA.
According to the Americans, Husak benefited from the situation – he found party leadership
sufficient support to replace Dubcek. He was on April 17 when he was behind him
the new head of the Communist Party removed a clear majority of the central members
from the party's committee.
However, he could not rely on the absolute support of Brezhnev.
"The Soviet people apparently gave him conditional support because they considered him
the most powerful predator among the communists in Prague, "said the CIA.
Indra or Bilaak
Moscow – still nervous of anti-Soviet moods
in Czechoslovakia – she was curious as Husak had advised. He stood up
the head of normalization, but it was questionable whether the results would be Brezhnev
completely to taste.
According to the CIA, the Kremlin played with the idea that Husak had acted
somewhat moderate, it will be necessary to replace it with a hard line
Party. The Americans assumed that in that case they would consider
there was one of the fanatical dogmatists who signed
invitation letter inviting the invasion. The CIA gave the greatest chance
Alois Indra, acquired a strong position in the close leadership of the Communist Party. As Husak
Brezhnev was disappointed, Moscow also had to keep Vasil Bilak in reserve
knew he and Husak were hating each other.
Husak settled, Brezhnev satisfied, because he became a hard normalizer.
He was demoted by the Dorkeans, the people who were excluded from the job
disagree with the occupation. But it could have been much worse.
If Indra or Bilak came to power. It is not possible
to rule out that these fanatics would like to build Stalinist thinking
galgen, or care at least for life or for the long term
penalties for so-called counter-revolutionaries.
The Husak – despite the fact that it radiated a strong, devastating frost on the shoots
Prague spring – did not go to the limit. "There is also no strength in leadership
Neither the Communist Party nor the Central Committee would try to return
fifties. Our party does not accept the built-up court
process, "he announced at the end of January 1969, as the CIA report noted.
These words (although he certainly did not speak in the name of the inviting signatories
of the letter) was not expected. Maybe because he felt terrible on his own skin
villains. In 1954 he was convicted in the so-called trial
with bourgeois nationalists. The court granted him a life sentence. (In
In 1960 he was released after a massive presidential amnesty and later
When the CIA saw Husak, Indra and Bilak
First of all, he was interested in keeping himself in power
decisions. There were four things in politics. Unite Communist
feast and recovery are leading roles in society.
Create and maintain an effective system of control over the population and beyond
civil society. Avoid disturbing influence of so-called
antisocialists (the stubborn sympathizers of Alexandru Dubcek). again
to win the trust of the leaders of the states who sent troops in August 1968
Czechoslovakia and other socialist allies. But you could not
even though it is a non-border support from Moscow, because it is a communist process
normalization is not yet complete.
One of the signers of the invitation letter, which justified Moscow
the so-called Brotherly International Assistance in connection with the invasion of Warsaw troops
contract. He was one of the few who had learned it beforehand
on the planned occupation of Czechoslovakia. As the political downfall of Dubcek
Leonid Brezhnev did not give Husák's footsteps, he probably would
head of the CPC to replace Indrom. When personal changes were made, he succeeded
to push the hardline into the government of various officials. He became a member
the presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, where he could breathe stronger in the neck of Husák.
Likewise a fanatical settler of Stalinist ways such as Indra. It would be
he could count on him as a possible replacement for Husak, if he did
did not meet Brezhnev's expectations sufficiently. Especially in communists
circles in Slovakia tried to strengthen its position at the expense of Husák,
with which they did not hate each other. Bialak has strengthened its position in Prague,
that he became a member of the Bureau as well as of Indra and under the supervision of foreigners
issues. The head of diplomacy was moderated by Jan Marko, but in fact
did not affect political matters.